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HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES
Human Rights issues are surrounded by
great silence in the social sciences. Academics
don't discuss them much. Scholars seem to be
ill at ease with them, unless they belong to the
small circle of activists who don't talk as much
as try to do something about real people in
distress. As an anthropologist and Middle East
scholar, I am curious about this silence and
about our defenses against professional
involvement in human rights issues.
Judged by the scholarly documents we
produce, most of us seem to dissociate
professionally from the burning life and death
issues facing people in the world today. We
seem to be blissfully oblivious of the fact that
the comfortable island of relative peace and
prosperity we inhabit and take for granted is
both shrinking and ever harder to defend against
what amounts to an onslaught of distraught
people within our own society (which
conceptually we hide behind depersonifying
terms like crime and poverty), and from the
outside in the form of increasing pressure from
refugees, illegal immigrants, demands for our
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military and economic resources. We don't face
these issues in the scientific community nor do
we take up the challenge to our understanding of
"human" they pose. Of course, there always are
some among us who do, and there are many
more who become personally involved in down-
to-earth problem solving and relief work,
especially when it concerns the groups they are
studying, but even most of these social scientists
do not transcend the separation of theory and
practice: their activism is rooted in caritas, and
their professional concerns are rooted in the
theories of their disciplines. Not even the
current "hot" discourses in anthropology, the
discipline that ought to reflect our global
outlook on humanity sharper than any other,
have much, if anything, to contribute to
theorizing the current human condition. The
postmodern word-spinners have declared modern
society (ours, they mean primarily, but also the
global village) a postmodern one. It is marked
by dislocation, alienation, multiculturalism,
world-system economies, widespread borrowing
of uprooted cultural items, romantic longing for
an idealized past, and increasing anhedonia
(Denzin 1991: 5). Beyond this definition,
however, the postmodern discourse cannot
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handle postmodem society theoretically because
it lacks a matrix of standards as a background
against which a society and its culture could be
observed. Even as description, it stops before it
gets to the really ugly parts, indeed, unable to
call anything "ugly".
There is also a personal reason for my
interest in the human rights movement. As I
was using the various theoretical approaches of
the day in the social sciences in the course of
my professional life, I came to develop a good
ear, I like to think, for hearing critical appraisals
of the cultural and social dynamics by the
members of the groups I studied in Iran.
Theoretically, two levels of analysis ought to be
kept separate in such appraisals, even if
practically this sometimes is next to impossible
to do: what I, the politicized outsider, perceive
to be an injustice, let us say, or a pain, and what
the people themselves see as injustice, or pain,
might be different. But awareness of our
ethnocentrist tendencies can be cultivated, as can
caution in interpretation. For anthropologists this
kind of ethnocentrism rarely is a problem. The
real problem arose for me when I tried to
describe and to present the contradictions, the
suffering, the discontent which individual
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people, or whole groups such as women, for
example, expressed about their condition.
Increasingly over the past decade or so, so many
of my colleagues developed a deaf ear to this
criticism from within, and an outright hostility
towards any kind of criticism of "native"
cultures, that some of us have become very
curious about what is going on in our profession
that allows a politically correct, truly
ethnocentric, so-called multicultural perspective
to preempt serious analysis. For example, one
of the very few marxist-feminist North
Africanistists recently decided not to talk any
more about cliterectomy, which is widespread in
the area she studies; at the 1993 Middle East
Studies Association Meeting she declined to talk
about ethnographic issues at all. She wants to
talk only about general topics and theory
because her politically correct conscience does
not allow her to potentially "misrepresent" the
people she knows better than probably anybody
else in the world; because her discussion of
genital mutilation of women might lead to the
culture being criticized for misogynist practices;
and because she does not want her knowledge to
be potentially used for any political or cultural
interference. Well, talk of the good old ivory
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tower as the new postmodern heaven!
All our standards by which we, as
scientists, could describe the discontent and
injustice we see, have eroded. That painful
recognition led me to look at the Bill of Human
Rights as the only universally accepted standard
for human dignity and human conduct left to us.
Presently, Human Rights are the only basis on
which new theories of the human condition,
which after all is the core of the social sciences,
could be built, yet this basis is heavily attacked.
The Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776 laid
the foundation for a controversy about human
rights that is not settled yet. It did so with its
insistence on the essential freedom of the
individual - one is born free - which leads to the
claim to natural, unalienable personal rights.
This idea is both the inspiration and the
burden of Human Rights as declared in 1948 by
the United Nations. Ultimately, HR are based
on the same liberal-humanist assumptions about
the unitary nature of the subject and conscious
subjectivity of the individual that had inspired
Virginian citizens (followed by French citizens
with the Declaration of Human and Citizens'
Rights of 1789) almost 200 years earlier.
This intellectual heritage is a burden
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today because philosophically it places Human
Rights into a quintessentially western discourse,
easily identified as ethnocentric to the ancient
core, and, in its claim to universality, also as
hegemonic. And what is worse today among
intellectuals striving to walk at least in the
shadow of politically correct ideologies than to
be labelled western, ethnocentric and supportive
of hegemonies of whatever kind?
In 1947, the American Anthropological
Association passed a resolution on human rights,
drafted by on of its most esteemed members, M.
Herskovits, to be submitted to the UN. Among
others, it reads: "In the main, people are willing
to live and let live, exhibiting a tolerance for
behavior of another group different from their
own, especially where there is no conflict in the
subsistence field." This means, equality and
tolerance and good will for all is kind of a
universal common sense, the anthropologists tell
us. Into this idyll, however, came a "point of
view ...that emerged from the history of Western
Europe and America," where "economic
expansion, control of armaments, and an
evangelical religious tradition have translated the
recognition of cultural differences into a
summons to action." This summons culminated
---------- 6 ----------
in so-called action anthropology in the 'sixties,
and is with us still today in several forms. The
engagement on behalf of natives was deemed
necessary to counter "philosophical systems that
have stressed absolutes in the realm of values
and ends. Definitions of freedom, concepts of
the nature of human rights, and the like, have
thus been narrowly drawn ....The history of the
expansion of the western world has been marked
by demoralization of human personality and the
disintegration of human rights" (meaning the
"natural" human rights, rooted in the primordial,
self-regulatory goodness of small groups,)
"among the peoples over whom hegemony has
been established." (Executive Board, AAA 1947:
540-541).
Quite logically, after all this rhetoric, the
Executive Board rejected the idea of a
declaration of universal human rights based on
the Western democratic individualistic model in
its recommendation to the UN. In much of the
non-western world, anthropologists argued, the
individual is not a free agent in our sense, not
an autonomous subjectivity loosely connected to
other autonomous subjectivities, but is firmly
integrated into a group and derives self-
understanding from membership in the group.
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Stressing rights for individuals based on our
notion of freedom thus alienates natives from
that which gives them structure and meaning. It
dehumanizes and colonializes them. Instead, the
Executive Board recommended in a roundabout
way what Herskovits (1942: 560) succinctly had
said earlier: "...the concept of freedom should be
realistically redefined as the right to be exploited
in terms of the patterns of one's own culture".
In other words, killing a person ritually or
otherwise in our culture is a crime, but killing a
person in the name of sacrifice to a God among
the ancient Aztecs is a custom to be honored.
Individual suffering is made plausible and thus
acceptable within the context of its culture.
Culture is privileged over the individual;
cultural relativism reigns supreme on the level
of groups, vague as the term" group" is; and by
implication the West with its ethnocentric
"common sense" ideology of personal autonomy
and rights only meddles and muddles in the
native scene, and is best kept out of everything.
The anthropologist is left at the gate to the
world as the guardian of all cultures and of
Culture.
The Human Rights Declaration of 1948
(which did not follow the anthropologists'
,...,-"....;,,...,------8 ----,...,-----
recommendation but based human rights on
rights of the individual to life, speech, religion),
thus from the very beginning had an uneasy
relationship with the experts on the human
condition in the social sciences.
Much to their credit, many
anthropologists disagreed with this then
professionally correct stance. They pointed to
the massive atrocities in Europe at the time,
which, indeed, on a personal, individual basis,
challenged cultural relativism as nothing had
ever challenged it before. (The convenient way
out of this dilemma was a linguistic sleight of
hand, so to speak: "...our sense of 'culture' ," a
prominent American anthropologist, William
Howells, wrote in a letter to the AAA in 1947,
"is not synonymous with 'political system', and
is not to be confused with it. Otherwise
perverse people can say we are stating that
Franco is just as good as anybody else ..."
(Washburn 1987: 942). Franco is bad, the
Italian culture is beyond good and evil, and
fascism concerns only politicians; incredible as
this sounds today, then it worked.)
Still, cultural relativism as an assumption
(it never really amounted to a formal scientific
theory), reemerged from the turmoil unharmed,
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clinging to the claim of scientific objectivity, a
solid anti-western bias, and propelled by
unbounded openmindedness and protectiveness
towards non-western societies that were seen by
anthropologists as victims of western
interference. If this sounds like several
contradictions, so be it: each decade has its
politically but not necessarily logically correct
way of going about the social scientific
enterprise. An anthropologist at that time was
defined as "a person who respects every culture-
pattern but his own" (Herskovits 1951: 23).
This definition works just as well today:
Cultural Relativism derived then and still derives
much of its power from anthropologists' and
social scientists' hostility towards the values of
their own society.
By the 'fifties, anthropologists quite
generally felt a collective guilt for the injustices
native peoples suffered at the hands of the
westerners. They were fed up with colonial-
imperialist schemes that had used (and thus
implicitly misused) anthropologists in the
'thirties and 'forties, and with the economic
exploitation of non-western peoples in an
imperialist context. From the 'fifties onward
social scientists increasingly supported and
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defended just about everything "native", from
local beliefs and customs to indigenous political
power hierarchies, but especially "the new
representatives of the societies for whose
cultural values they had fought so hard"
(Washburn 1987: 940). Mindful of "groups" as
the locus of culture, they rooted for
independence movements with a touching belief
in the good will of the leaders of the newly
emerging states and the common-sense power of
culture. But when one after the other of these
leaders "defined freedom in such a way as to
cause millions of their members to flee if they
could, or ... to be slaughtered in situ (Cambodia,
Uganda, Ethiopia at that time), anthropologists
faced a theoretical and practical dilemma."
Adding embarrassment to the dilemma, many
refugees fled to Europe and the US whenever
and by whatever means they could, into the very
eye of all oppressive evil, if one believed the
social scientists. Something was very, very
wrong: people whose identity was derived from
being members of a cultural group, very
obviously were suffering as individuals under
the weight of oppression by their own people.
The micro-level of the everyday practices of a
culture inserted itself on the macro-level of
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global cultural processes as conceived by social
scientists.
The dilemma led to a profound
questioning of the relevance, the heuristic
propriety of a relativist stance. For
anthropologists, always at the front of the
relativist way of looking at the world, the AAA
1947 injunction that individuals are free only
within the "freedom" of their own societies
became uncomfortable. It dawned on us that
some indigenous cultural practices are
detrimental to the welfare of individual members
of that culture; that some cultural practices, no
matter how well integrated, traditional, deep-
rooted, and commonsensical to the people,
probably are not worth being supported given
the human suffering or environmental
destruction they entail. Rapid population
growth, for example, is a case in point.
The governments in many of the new
nations (of Africa, for example), no matter what
they called themselves ("democratic" was
popular because it promised access to aid money
from the West) in many instances had to be
recognized as representing the interests of either
their elite or else of one or the other particular
ethnic group, much to the detriment by neglect
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or hostility of other ethnic groups. Not just
individuals suffered in the name of their own
culture and local customs, but whole social
strata and ethnic groups suffered. Moreover, the
interests and "freedoms" of different ethnic
groups within a region or a nation often were
mutually exclusive to such a degree that
supporting one as legitimate by its own cultural
traditions automatically implied denying others.
Ethically and theoretically, we were in a pickle,
and are there still.
At the same time, the analytic and
conceptual apparatus social scientists used to
describe and compare cultural features was
wholly nomothetic, located within the western,
hegemonic scientific discourse: kinship terms,
concepts to capture religious experiences,
models of interpersonal relationships, indices for
folktale motifs were cast in social-science
language (which is English) or in French-
English-derived neologisms, in the attempts to
bring order into the confusing variation of all
the relative cultural particularities out there. The
scientific language, just as the scientific
enterprise, is truly hegemonic, decentering all
other indigenous discourses, but it tends to be
seen globally as a non-political, a necessary if
---------- 13 ----------
not beneficial hegemony, and as such is not
questioned very loudly outside Euro-America.
It allowed anthropologists to claim to be both
activists working at the grassroots who know
good from evil, committed to supporting the
causes of the people they know more about than
anybody else, and generalist, "objective,"
scientists who stood above the muck and
squalor.
Yet, in all this fumbling and groping, we
had some impact on the discussion of human
rights: our longstanding insistence on context, on
cultural geography, environment, evolution, on
systems and interrelationships, on the holistic
view, however compromised by relativism,
added sophistication to the construction of
"peoples" and of culture in the general
intellectual and political frame in which, among
others, human rights are discussed. And our
focus on groups, ethnic, religious, or whatever,
and their rights to articulate their own concerns
and preferences as a group without undue
uninformed interference, helped to broaden the
UN's narrow and ethnocentric vision of the
autonomous person - or so we hope at least. I
like to think that the general public wouldn't
know let alone care at all that Yanomami in
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northern Brazil are gunned down by illegal
goldminers on their reservation, or that Kurdish
villages are gassed by Iraqi troops, or that
indigenous peasants in Mexico are oppressed, if
it had not been sensitized to the concepts of
ethnicity, identity, and the right to cultural self-
articulation over the years.
A third impact on human rights of the
trying-to-do-right-by-everybody attitude of the
experts on culture was on their content. The
first declaration of 1948 (30 Articles in all),
which concentrated exclusively on individual
rights in a generic sense, was supplemented
several times. In 1966, at the height of cultural
relativism, it came to include economic, social,
and cultural rights as well as civil and political
ones, in two separate pacts. Several so-called
Conventions have followed since, such as, in
1979, on discrimination against women. In fact,
the doors to HR inclusion opened for so many
different interest groups and concerns, that, as
one observer at the HR Conference in Vienna
this past June put it: "The UN Pacts have led to
a clear watering-down of the concept of human
rights: they grant all world citizens a pseudo-
entitlement for everything that is good and dear"
- without hope for deliverance, is implied. Even
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a "decent" standard of living is now seen as a
basic human right (Unterberger 1993: II).
Indeed, new rights are still being advocated,
encouraging expectations that cannot possibly be
met anytime soon.
The US has not signed any of the
Conventions and has bad human rights records
in regard to prisons, capital punishment, and
race relations, but, alas, "The West", with all its
poverty, glitter, cut-throat competition,
injustices, loss of soul, human rights violations,
and general malaise is still, as in the 'forties and
'fifties, it seems, the place where just about
everybody wants to go who isn't here already.
The extent of this wish is believable only to
those of us who travel widely in the so-called
Third World, and to those who follow statistics
on asylum petitions and on illegal immigration.
The theoretical discussion of this issue,
which ought to be done by social scientists, is
similar to 50 years ago: social scientists,
motivated by a collective distaste for hegemony
and imperialism, and weary of being used to
support relations of domination, counsel to stay
out of everything: we should not interfere in the
internal affairs of another nation, and this
interference includes human rights, because we
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are a bad influence and because we are
hopelessly compromised by our own failures.
Yet, at the same time, we should advocate
unlimited tolerance and the provision of
unlimited social, financial, political space and
resources in our midst for those who are voting
with their feet to escape their own cultures or
governments. Obviously, we can't do it right by
our own conflicting standards.
But it gets worse.
In this program of non-interference we
are supported by many governments in
developing nations, especially those with bad
human rights records, with only a slight twist:
they agree with us that the West should stay out
of a nation's internal affairs unless invited, and
this includes, emphatically, use of Human Rights
as a pretext for interference. But upon request
the West should find unlimited resources for
humanitarian and economic programs in the
poor nations, because it is a human right of
every person to be fed. The African Charter of
Human Rights, for example, passed in 1981,
contains duties as well as rights: among others,
every African is obliged to guard and to
strengthen what is called positive African
cultural values (Cohen 1989: 1015). Anything
coming from the outside thus is to be judged
against the so-called positive indigenous values,
and to be rejected if these values are
contradicted. African delegates to the HR
Conference in Vienna quite clearly used this to
argue against Human Rights in the context of
the treatment of prisoners and of women. The
imposition of Human Rights was interfering
with positive African values, they said. The
Islamic Republic of Iran, which officially is
honoring the Bill of Human Rights and the
Conventions signed by representatives of the
previous regime, maintains against all criticism
that the human rights of Muslims are the most
comprehensive possible because they are rooted
in the Qoran, the word of God, and that
therefore the Human Rights of the United
Nations are subsumed under their own. I have
professional colleagues in US, "objective
scientists", who loudly agree with this stance.
For other Muslim fundamentalists, for example
in Algeria, democracy itself is un-Islamic
because every Muslim is part of the umma, the
Community of the Faithful, which requires of its
members to fulfill duties rather than to insist on
rights. In an absolute and universal sense, only
God has rights. Saudi Arabia, for example,
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subscribes to this argument: practically, there
Human Rights are immaterial; they are used
mostly as a political tool in discussions with the
West. Delegates to the recent World Conference
who are committed to HR saw it as their
greatest challenge to halt the global slide into
cultural particularism in regard to human rights,
and to face the danger posed to the claim to
universality by Third World nations on the basis
of cultural autonomy vs. western hegemony.
Only at the very last moment did the Assembly
of Delegates muster enough voices to reaffirm
Human Rights as we know them, including their
universality, and including women. (There was
a danger to separate women from "human" and
to draft a separate Bill of Women's Rights.
This would have opened the door very wide to
the sanctioning of culturally-specific but
nevertheless detrimental practices regarding
women.)
Where do the social sciences fit in this?
The social sciences meanwhile have gone
postmodern. And in very good faith too.
Because have we not inflicted ourselves on
defenseless natives, using them for PhD
dissertations and our own professional
advancements? Have we not been studying
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down, pulling rank, as it were, on the voiceless
others in small places? Have we not pretended
to ask and observe "objectively" in the name of
science while we have, at best, "created others",
our objects of inquiry, as non-us? And then
created texts to which the natives could not
possibly relate? Have we not privileged some
voices over others? Men, for example, over
women, the headman over the village idiot, a
shaman over his or her client, the historical
records of an earlier imperialist administration
over the tales of a local story-teller? And have
not we all, except the truly enlightened, been
after some kind of "truth", which is the ultimate
postmodern blasphemy? Appearance
notwithstanding, this is not an absurd
overstatement. Our books and Journals are
filled with texts of soulsearching of this kind. It
looks absurd only because I put this earnest,
pervasive, self-indulgent language into the
context of the happenings in the world that
concern human rights.
Some concrete data are in order now.
Today in the world, about 200 million
children under the age of 15 have to earn their
own living. (International Labor Organization
Report 1993, quoted in Der Spiegel 1993: 186;
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this figure, the ILO says, could be three times as
high.) Anti-Slavery International counts some
25 million children working as slaves in India,
some 8 million working in forced labor in the
Andes, millions as debt-slaves in India and
Pakistan. Nobody even attempts to count the
children working as domestic servants in Africa,
in the Middle East. Children work as miners
(Columbia), carpet weavers (India, Iran,
Pakistan, among others), fruitpickers (Central
America, US) porters, beggars (intentionally
crippled or starved by their organizers); they cut
sugar cane, roll cigarettes and cut matches
(India), harvest pesticide-covered and highly
allergenic flowers such as Jasmine (Egypt), ride
racing camels in Saudi Arabia, all for the
lowest, if any, wages, and usually alienated from
those too by their parents or their managers.
Children are also sold as organ donors and into
prostitution, by the thousands, if not tens of
thousands, annually. No one knows how many
are killed. How can this happen? Is not taking
care of one's offspring one of the common-
sense, general attributes of humans, an adaptive
feature bred into us in the course of our
evolution? A professor of Economics and Labor
Law in Bangkok (Oer Spiegel 1993: 196) is
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quoted as saying this about it: "Childhood, as it
is understood in the West, is superfluous from
the point of our culture and a squandering of
resources." In other words, our notions of the
dignity and needs of children is on a par with
wasting energy so typical of the West generally.
The Declaration of the Human Rights of the
Child was passed in 1979. Now, 14 years later,
concerned lawmakers in Thailand are trying to
get an emergency law on the books which would
make it illegal to employ children under the age
of 12, but they are not optimistic about its
enforceability. Hearing native defenders of
cultural particularity like this Thai professor, it
is little wonder that this is the least enforced or
even talked about of all the Human Rights
declarations. By not talking about children, by
not figuring them into our theoretical
explications on the human condition, we
condone this silence - in the name of what?
Cultural diversity? I have no answer, but I can
tell you that the silence on children in
anthropology, sociology and political science is
thundering.
The death penalty, which violates a
Human Right, today is practiced in over 100
nations, including the US, which finds itself in
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the fine company of only six other (all Third
World) nations as far as killing people under the
age of 18 is concerned. Amnesty International
estimates that some 17000 executions were
carried out in 1992 worldwide, most of them in
China and Iran.
The number of indigenous ethnic groups,
almost 5000 worldwide, is decreasing rapidly -
genocide, done swiftly, goes almost unnoticed
(such as in the Bangladeshi Chittagong Hills, in
Indonesia, among South American Indians here
and there. Cultural SUlvival, an anthropologist-
founded and -run publication, keeps track of
this.)
Rapes of millions of women annually are
not even counted; rape as a tactic of war is not
considered a war crime. I am not talking only
about Bosnia; according to Human Rights
Watch Groups, in Peru women are raped by
government security forces; Burmese soldiers
rape ethnic minorities as a matter of strategy, so
do Indian soldiers fighting an insurgency in
Assam (Gossman 1993:3). In Muslim societies
under Shari a law, a raped woman can be
punished severely for fornication unless she has
witnesses testifying that she was overpowered.
Domestic violence against women is the
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major cause of injury and death among women
worldwide, but falls in the "cultural autonomy"
category of domestic privacy in most nations.
Trafficking in women (the sex-trade is a
multi-billion dollar enterprise for its organizers),
and forced prostitution are so widespread,
especially in SE Asia, that it no longer can
simply be ignored completely (Barry 1992:1f.).
The Women's Rights Project researching the
topic in Thailand, for example, estimates that
some 20,000 Burmese women alone are in the
Thai prostitution trade-circle. Girls are lured to
Thailand by agents who prefer the young ones
because they are likely to be AIDS-free and easy
to control. A popular way to recruit prostitutes
in Asia is by gang-raping a young girl, who then
is abandoned by her people. (The harrowing
Jugoslavian movie, Time of the Gypsies,
illustrates this procedure for a different part of
the world.)
Some 10 million people are refugees,
most of whom live in abject poverty. Often
now, individual nations both create and receive
refugees (Iran and Afghanistan, for example),
which complicates the picture.
More men in percent of the total
population are imprisoned in the US than almost
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anywhere else (and more still in Michigan).
Amnesty International, one of the oldest and
most respected Human Rights Watch
organizations, has amassed staggering
information on the mistreatment, torture, murder
of prisoners worldwide.
Hunger, illiteracy, and poverty-related
diseases are on the rise everywhere.
All of these conditions and atrocities are
covered by Human Rights Conventions. They
should not happen in countries signatory to
them, or if they did, the responsible
governments should be reprimanded. Double
standards in this regard are so disparate, that
Austria, for example, which signed the very
stringent European Human Rights Bill, was cited
22 times at the European Court in Strasbourg
since 1958, for violations such as keeping
arrested people too long in - safe and
comfortable - custody, while the US and others
keep on executing prisoners, and the richest
nation in the world does not house and feed a
quarter of its children.
Anthropologists are trained to observe the
human condition any place in the world they can
get to. One would think it reasonable to assume
that anthropologists see and report the hardships,
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injustices, oppressions, deprivations, that
individuals as well as groups suffer at the hands
of their families, their fellow group members,
their leaders, or outsiders. Reports on genocide,
refugee squalor, slavery, rape, sex tourism, are
too massive, too universal to be chalked up
against exceptional circumstances which we
could safely ignore. But, with exceptions, it is
not western anthropologists who do the
reporting, but members of charitable institutions,
interest groups, NGOs, inspired by and
connected to the Human Rights. The
anthropologists and other social scientists who
have the academic floor at the moment are not
looking there.
Where are they looking? They look at
themselves and passionately argue the fine point:
the researcher's relationship with himlherself in
the field; and whether one's professional ethics
allow one to talk about marital rape, or listen to
any critical voice without listening to the other
voices too. At the recent AAA Meeting
(November 1993) a whole panel was devoted to
papers by couples talking about their
experiences while doing fieldwork together. It
was in a big room, and packed, and there was
much joking and merriment. It was a huge
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success. Reporting on and analyzing one's own
experiences (what I call writing ego-graphies) is
done in the name of doing justice to one's
ethnographic partners, the IIothers II , whom one
does no longer dare simply to represent or to
paraphrase, let alone compare to others.
Generalizations are out, and reader-response,
rather than the author, is responsible for the
creation of meaning. Anthropologists and many
of their fellow social scientists now are in the
business of IIgiving voices". The voice of a
woman who is beaten by her husband in Egypt,
let us say, should, of course, be heard, but so
should her husband's. Both have a story, both
are right. The woman hurts, but this is her
culture, isn't it? The husband and wife perform
their marital drama according to the rules and
possibilities of their culture - who am I, the
anthropologist, to dare evaluate? We are in
the grip of an ultrarelativist mode of perceiving
the world against which pales the good old
cultural relativism a previous generation had
labored under. Only some stances are IIsafe II to
take: anti-US, anti-Israel, anti-western Europe.
Thus, it is politically correct and seen as
relevant to report at the Middle East Studies
Meeting (November 1993) the linguistic
ramifications of the Turks' second-class
treatment in Germany, but not that Turkish
dissidents in Turkey disappear, or that Kurds are
slaughtered there. Reports of Israeli settlers
going on a rampage against Palestinians are
welcome, but not of Palestinians killing their
own dissidents. At the 1992 MESA meeting, a
Moroccan woman lawyer who reported critically
on some women's legal issues in Morocco, was
politely reprimanded by a US anthropologist and
a sociologist in the audience (both women) for
her ethnocentrism and lack of understanding for
the cultural context. And she a professional
Moroccan woman herself!
In such an intellectual climate Human
Rights are more an embarrassment than an
inspiration. Again at the AAA meeting in 1993,
the Human Rights Commission within the
Association, formed only in 1988, called a
forum to discuss the situation in Bosnia: it had
a smaller audience than had the panel on
couples doing fieldwork in cute places I
mentioned before. Nothing came of it in terms
of resolutions, and quite some time was used to
discuss the correct channels a recommendation
has to travel to reach the Executive Board of the
AAA. At this and the regular Commission
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meeting, I had the very distinct impression that
everybody was pussyfooting around hot issues,
afraid to take any stance that might conceivably
be seen as taking sides.
And I have to admit that it takes strong
guts to face the world of Human Rights abuses.
Listening to testimony-session after testimony-
session about these issues at the World
Conference in June, I literally felt sick often,
and totally unprepared conceptually to deal with
what I heard. Yet, I have been a practicing
anthropologist for 30 years.
At the Conference, which lasted three
weeks, there were so few anthropologists as to
cause comment. I paid my way there myself,
and had offered the AAA to be their delegate,
but they had declined, saying a member of their
Human Rights Committee wanted to go. If
anybody actually did go, I never saw that person
in the three weeks I was there. Another
anthropologist, a Middle East scholar I know,
attended the Conference for a few days but not
so much as a scholar than as a member of an
interest group working in Peru: she got
interested in the HR situation in Peru after she
had adopted two Peruvian Indian children. For
a short while a German anthropology student
was working there for a NGO concerned with
the right of peoples to feed themselves. Beyond
this, the field was left entirely to the nearly 2000
NGO activists downstairs in the Conference
building, and to the official UN delegates
upstairs. The scholars stayed home. The
official delegates talked relativism often; I think
they dearly love us because we give them the
script for explaining that human rights violations
in their countries are not violations but cultural
traditions. The NGOs, I must report, can't
understand why we chose to abandon the just
causes of the common people we have made it
our professional goal to study, in the name of
nouveau relativism. I was asked about this a
dozen times. The director of a woman's NGO
(Sisterhood is Global, with advisory status to the
UN) told me that she had just about given up on
listening to social scientists in the US at all.
She cannot use what they offer. As
academicians, we have very little, it seems, to
contribute to the debate on the universality and
validity of the concept of human rights, to the
prioritization of human rights, to the
implementation of Human Rights. We deny the
challenge to our old notions of the intrinsic
value of culture, to the good in us all, by the
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massive, human-made suffering in the world.
Three years ago, the AAA Commission on
Human Rights adopted what it calls "a broad
working definition of human rights:
Anthropology as an academic discipline studies
the bases and the forms of human diversity and
unity; anthropology as a practice seeks to apply
this knowledge to the solution of human
problems. As a professional organization of
anthropologists, the AAA has long been, and
should continue to be, concerned whenever
human difference is made the basis for a denial
of rights - where 'human' is understood in its
full range of cultural, social, linguistic and
biological senses." (Anthropology Newsletter
vol. 34, no 3: 1,5.) Obviously, good will and
some concrete questions are alive in some of us
at least, but as long as there does not ensue a
lively debate in the profession, and a broad
willingness to dare to transcend the
conventional, politically correct ways of dealing
with what is "human", I see us march straight
ahead into never-never land.
CONCLUSION
With our post modern abandonment of the
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enlightenment paradigm we have also abandoned
attempts to talk about universal attributes of
"human", including the subjective and objective
sufferings people endure out there. With this I
do not imply a call to arms - in fact, there are
quite a few committed social scientists working
in NGOs and humanitarian organizations - but
rather I deplore our inability, our obvious
unwillingness to face the Human Rights issues,
theory, practice and violations alike, and to
theorize the human condition on this level.
After 60 years in the business of analyzing
people as socio-cultural beings we still cannot
come to terms with universal attributes of what
it means to be human. We, the inventors of
"society" and of "culture," have not kept pace
with their obvious transformations in the wake
of population explosions, the arms explosion,
and consumerism on a global scale. Despite all
the postmodern and deconstruction rhetoric, we
do not face the de facto deconstruction of the
concept "human" which we have taken for
granted for 100 years and have reified in our
social sciences. We have not abandoned the
unilinear, essentially evolutionistic model of the
development of societies, of knowledge, and of
culture being able to cope with challenges. We
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do not know how to handle the issues we cannot
ignore without abandoning relativism, and thus,
we seem to think, any claim to making science.
Instead, it seems, we chose almost collectively
to look elsewhere, where it is safer, to the
quaint, the abstract, and the historical, leaving
the field to charities and to those people whose
commitment and engagement precludes
theorizing the problems they are trying to solve.
What are we afraid of?
---------- 33 ----------
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barry, Kathleen, Sexual Exploitation Violates
Human Rights. Coalition Report, Fall
1992, pp. 1-2.
Cohen, Ronald, Human Rights and Cultural
Relativism: The Need for a New
Approach. American Anthropologist 91,
1989, pp. 014-1017.
Denzin, Norman, Images of Postmodern
Society. Sage Publishers, London 1991.
Executive Board, American Anthropological
Association, Statement on Human Rights
Submitted to the Commission on Human
Rights, United Nations. American
Anthropologist 49, 1947, pp. 539-543.
Gossman, Patricia, Widespread Rape in Kashmir
escapes the Spotlight. Human Rights
Watch, 1993, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 3.
Herskovits, Melville, On the Values in Culture.
Scientific Monthly 54, 1942. Quoted in
Washburn 1987.
Herskovits, Melville, Tender- and Tough-
Minded Anthropology and the Study of
Values in Culture. Southwestern Journal
of Anthropology 7, 1951, pp. 22-31.
Quoted in Washburn 1987.
---------- 34 ----------
Kommenda, Benedict, Wie der Europarat
Osterreich veranderte. Die Presse, June
12, 1993, p. II.
Der Spiegel, Kinder in Knechtschaft. Vol. 47,
Nov. 22, 1993, pp. 186-202.
Unterberger, Andreas, Alles,
wiinschenswert scheint.
June 12, 1993, p. VIII.
was gut und
Die Presse,
Washburn, Wilcomb E., Cultural Relativism,
Human Rights, and the AAA. American
Anthropologist 89, 1987, pp. 939-943.
---------- 35 ----------
BIOGRAPHY
Erika Loeffler Friedl was born and raised in
Austria, having received her Ph.D. in
Anthropology from the University of Mainz in
Germany, 1964. She has over 6 years of
ethnographic fieldwork in Iran with a special
emphasis on women's issues and has written
various articles on the topic that have been
published in both books and professional
journals. Her most recent publications
include the book Women of Deh Koh (Penguin
Books, 1991), and In the Eye of the Storm:
Women in Postrevolutionary Iran (J.B. Tauris
and Syracuse University Press, 1994) which she
co-edited with M. Afkhami. She has been at
Western Michigan University since 1967 and
currently serves as Professor of Anthropology.
fI"o<I"...;"...;"...;"...; 36 ---"..,--"...;---
CENTER PUBLICATIONS
VOLUME I
No.1, October, 1987
Ethical Norms in Science
Rachelle D. Hollander
National Science Foundation
No.2, January, 1988
Ethics in Academia
Diether Haenicke
Western Michigan University
No.3, May, 1988
Thoughts on Keeping My Mouth Shut
David H. Smith
Poynter Center
Indiana University
-~-------- 37 ----------
No.4, June, 1988
Affirmative Action Defended
Laurence Thomas
Oberlin College
VOLUME II
No.1, November, 1988
Biomedical Ethics in the Soviet Union
Richard DeGeorge
University of Kansas
No.2, January, 1989
Do Professors Need Professional Ethics as
Much as Doctors and Lawyers?
James W. Nickel
University of Colorado
No.3, February, 1989
Ethical Dilemmas in Health Care:
Is Society Sending a Mixed Message?
John V. Hartline, M.D.
Neonatology, Kalamazoo, Michigan
No.4, March, 1989
Codes of Ethics in Business
Michael Davis
Illinois Institute of Technology
No.5, May, 1989
Should I (Legally) Be My Brother's Keeper?
Gilbert Geis
University of California--Irvine
VOLUME III
No.1, October, 1989
Surrogate Parenting: The Michigan Legislation
Lucille Taylor, Majority Counsel
Michigan State Senate
Paul Denenfeld, Legal Director
ACLU Fund of Michigan
No.2, December, 1989
Morality Versus Slogans
Bernard Gert
Dartmouth College
No.3, February, 1990
Ethical Reasoning and Analysis: The Elements
---------- 38 ----------
Martin Benjamin
Michigan State University
No.4, April, 1990
Women's Dilemma: Is it Reasonable to be
Rational?
Harriet Baber
University of San Diego
VOLUME IV
No.1, July, 1990
Higher-Order Discrimination
Adrian M.S. Piper
Wellesley College
No.2, November, 1991
Television Technology and Moral Literacy
Clifford G. Christians
University of Illinois--Urbana
~--------- 39 ----------
No.3, May, 1991
Virtue and the Health Professions
Janet Pisaneschi
Western Michigan University
VOLUME V
o. 1, November, 1991
Owning and Controlling Technical Information
Vivian Weil
Illinois Institute of Technology
No.2, March, 1992
The Imperative to Restore Nature: Some
Philosophical Questions
Lisa Newton
Fairfield University
No.3, May, 1992
Lying: A Failure of Autonomy and Self Respect
Jane Zembaty
The University of Dayton
No.4, June, 1992
National Health Insurance Proposals: An
Ethical Perspective
Alan O. Kogan, M.D.
Kalamazoo, Michigan
VOLUME VI
No.1 & 2, November, 1992
Arguing for Economic Equality
John Baker
University College, Dublin, Ireland
No.3 & 4, May, 1993
Reasonable Children
Michael Pritchard
Western Michigan University
No. 5 &6, June, 1993
Helping to Harm? The Ethical Dilemmas of
Managing Politically Sensitive Data
Sylvie C. Tourigny
Western Michigan University
VOLUME VII
,..",-..,1,...,-,...,--""';-- 40 __ ,..., ,-w _
No.1, September, 1993
Why Does Utilitarianism Seem Plausible?
John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
No.2, November, 1993
Can We Share Ethical Views with Other
Religions?
Robert Hannaford
Ripon College
~--------- 41 ----------
No.3, February, 1994
Narrative, Luck and Ethics: The Role of Chance
in Ethical Encounters, in Literarure and Real
Life Experiences
Nona Lyons
University of Southern Maine
No.4, February, 1994
Human Rights in the Social Sciences
Erika Loeffler Friedl
Western Michigan University
WINTER 1994 PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS
January 21 Roger Boisjoly, P.E.
Boisjoly Engineering
Commencement of a Professional
Career
February 9 Stuart J. Youngner, M.D.
Director, Clinical Ethics Program
University Hospitals of Cleveland
Expanding the Organ Donor
Pool: What Are the Limits?
March 17 J. Baird Callicott, Ph. D.
Professor of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin
Environmental Wellness
March 18 Paul Denenfeld, J.D.
Legal Director
American Civil Liberties Union
Thomas Schlindler
Director of Ethics
Mercy Health Services
Assisted Suicide and
Constitutional Rights
March 25 Dorothy Vawter
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Michigan State University
Donating, Procuring, and
Transplanting Human Fetal
Tissue: Ethical and Policy
Concerns
---------- 42 ----------
March 30
April 4
April 5
TBA
Sylvia Culp, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Western Michigan University
Shirley Bach, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy
Western Michigan University
Genetic Testing for Predisposition
to Colon Cancer
Laurence Mordekhai Thomas
Professor of Philosophy
Syracuse University
Telling Narratives: Blacks and
Jews
and
The Grips of Immorality: Child
Abuse and Moral Failure
Elinor Wittrup
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Massachusetts
Breast Implants: Implications for
Moral Philosophy
---------- 43 ----------


